Economic Theory





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Articles in refereed journals


You Owe Me

Amercian Econmic Review, Vol. 107, No. 2 (2017), 493-526 (with Ulrike Malmendier)


Auctions vs. Negotiations: The Role of Inefficient Renegotiation

RAND Journal of Economics, 48, No. 3 (2017), 647-672 (with Fabian Herweg)


Competition and Incentives

European Economic Review 98, (2017), 111-125 (with Lisa Fey and Carmen Thoma)


Contributions of Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström to Contract Theory

Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 119, No. 3 (2017), 489-511.


Delegating Pricing Power to Customers: Pay What You Want or Name Your Own Price?

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 136, (2017), 125-140 (with Florentin Krämer, Martin Spann and Lucas Stich).


Loss Aversion and Inefficient Renegotiation

Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 82, No. 1 (2015), 297-332 (with Fabian Herweg)

cover Use Abuse of Authority

Reference Points, Social Norms, and Fairness in Contract Renegotiation

Journal of the European Economic Association, Vol. 13, No. 1 (2015), 98-129 (with Björn Bartling)

Management Science

Pay What You Want as a Marketing Strategy in Monopolistic and Competitive Markets

Management Science, Vol. 61, No. 6 (2015), 1217-1236 (with Martin Spann and Robert Zeithammer)

Best Paper Award of the Verband der Hochschullehrer für Betriebswirtschaft 2015

doi: 10.1287/mnsc.2014.1946

Journal of Economics and Managerial Strategy

Complementary Patents and Market Structure

Journal of Economics and Management Science, Vol. 23, No. 1 (2014), 68-88.

doi: 10.1111/jems.12041

cover Use Abuse of Authority

Use and Abuse of Authority: A Behavioral Foundation of the Employment Relation

Journal of the European Association, Vol. 11, No. 4 (2013), 711-742 (with Björn Bartling and Ernst Fehr)

doi: 10.1111/jeea.12017


Discretion, Productivity, and Work Satisfaction

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 169, No. 1 (2013), 4-22 (with Björn Bartling and Ernst Fehr)

doi: 10.1628/093245613X660357

Bartling, Fehr, Schmidt (2012 AER) Screening, Competition, and Job Design - Economic Origins of Good Jobs

Screening, Competition, and Job Design: Economic Origins of Good Jobs

American Economic Review, Vol. 102, No. 2 (2012), 834–864 (with Björn Bartling and Ernst Fehr)

doi: 10.1257/aer.102.2.834


Social Preferences and Competition

Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 43, No. 5 (s1, 2011), 207-231

doi: 10.1111/j.1538-4616.2011.00415.x


Licensing Complementary Patents: `Patent Trolls´, Market Structure, and `Excessive Royalties´

Berkeley Technology Law Journal, Vol. 25 (2010), 1121-1144 (with Anne Layne-Farrar)


On Inequity Aversion: A Reply to Binmore and Shaked

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 73 (2010), 101-108 (with Ernst Fehr)

doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2009.12.001


The Role of Experiments for the Development of Economic Theories 

Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Vol. 10 (s1, 2009), 14-30

doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2516.2009.00304.x


Two Tales on Resale

International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 26 (2008), 1448-1460 (with Felix Höffler)

doi: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2008.02.004


Fairness and the Optimal Allocation of Property Rights

Economic Journal, Vol. 118 (2008), 1262-84 (with Ernst Fehr and Susanne Kremhelmer)

doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02169.x


Fairness and Contract Design

Econometrica, Vol. 75, No. 1 (2007), 121-154 (with Ernst Fehr and Alexander Klein)

doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0262.2007.00734.x

reprinted in Khalil, E.L. (ed.), The New Behavioral Economics, Vol. 1, Chapter 11, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2009

Adding a Stick to the Carrot? The Interaction of Bonuses and Fines

American Economic Review, Vol. 97, No. 2 (2007), 177-181 (with Ernst Fehr)

doi: 10.1257/aer.97.2.177


Inequality Aversion, Efficiency, and Maximin Preferences in Simple Distribution  Experiments: Comment

American Economic Review, Vol. 96, No. 5 (2006), 1912-1917 (with Ernst Fehr and Michael Naef)

doi: 10.1257/aer.96.5.1912


Conditional Allocation of Control Rights in Venture Capital Firms

Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaft, Special Issue 5 (2006), 39-52. (with Georg Gebhardt)


The Economics of Covenants as a Means of Efficient Creditor Protection

European Business Organization Law Review, Vol. 7, No. 1 (2006), 89-94

doi: 10.1017/S1566752906000899


An Economic Approach to Article 82 – Report by the European Advisory Group on Competition Policy

Competition Policy International, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2006), 111-154 (with Jordi Gual, Martin Hellwig, Anne Perrot, Michele Polo, Patrick Rey and Rune Stenbacka)

reprinted in Spanish as “Un enfoque económico del artícula 82” in El Abuso de la Posicíon de Dominio, ed. by S. Martinez Lage and A. Petitbò Juan, 99-154, Madrid 2006


Fairness and Incentives in a Multi-Task Principal-Agent Model

Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Vol. 106, No. 3 (2004), 453-474 (with Ernst Fehr)

doi: 10.1111/j.0347-0520.2004.00372.x


Convertible Securities and Venture Capital Finance

Journal of Finance, Vol. 58, No. 3 (2003), 1139-1166

doi: 10.1111/1540-6261.00561


Public Subsidies for Open Source? Some Economic Policy Issues

Harvard Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 16, No. 2 (2003), 473-505 (with Monika Schnitzer)


Discrete-Time Approximations of the Holmström-Milgrom Brownian Motion Model of Intertemporal Incentive Provision

Econometrica, Vol. 70, No. 6 (2002), 2225-2264 (with Martin Hellwig)

doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0262.2002.00439.x


Der Markt für Venture Capital: Anreizprobleme, Governance Strukturen und staatliche Interventionen

Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Vol. 3, No. 3 (2002), 235-256 (with Georg Gebhardt)

doi: 10.1111/1468-2516.00090


Fairness, Incentives, and Contractual Choices

European Economic Review, Vol. 44, No. 4-6 (2000), 1057-1068 (with Ernst Fehr)

doi: 10.1016/S0014-2921(99)00046-x


The Political Economy of Mass Privatization and the Threat of Expropriation

European Economic Review, Vol. 44, No. 2 (2000), 393-421

doi: 10.1016/S0014-2921(98)00080-4


A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation

Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 114, No. 3 (1999), 817-868 (with Ernst Fehr)

doi: 10.1162/003355399556151

Reprinted in: Colin F. Camerer (eds.), Advances in Behavioral Economics, Chapter 9, New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2004.

Sequential Investments and Options to Own

The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 29, No. 4 (1998), 633-653 (with Georg Nöldeke)

doi: 10.2307/2556087


Managerial Incentives and Product Market Competition

Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 64 (1997), 191-214

doi: 10.2307/2971709


Incomplete Contracts and Privatization

European Economic Review, Vol. 40 (1996), 569-579

doi: 10.1016/0014-2921(95)00070-4

reprinted in Czech, “Neúplné smlouvy a privatizace,” Politická Economie, Vol. 44 (1996), 515-523


Reputation in Perturbed Repeated Games

Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 69 (1996), 387-410 (with Martin Cripps and Jonathan Thomas)

doi: 10.1006/jeth.1996.0060


The Costs and Benefits of Privatization - An Incomplete Contracts Approach

Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 12 (1996), 1-24


Option Contracts and Renegotiation: A Solution to the Hold-Up Problem

The Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 26 (1995), 163-179 (with Georg Nöldeke)

doi: 10.2307/2555911


The Interaction of Explicit and Implicit Contracts 

Economics Letters, Vol. 48, No. 2 (1995), 193-199 (with Monika Schnitzer)

doi: 10.1016/0165-1765(94)00601-W


Reputation and Equilibrium Characterization in Repeated Games with Conflicting Interests

Econometrica, Vol. 61 (1993), 325-351

doi: 10.2307/2951554


Commitment through Incomplete Information in a Simple Repeated Bargaining Game

Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 60 (1993), 114-139

doi: 10.1006/jeth.1993.1037


Privatization and Management Incentives in the Transition Period in Eastern Europe

Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 17 (1993), 264-287 (with Monika Schnitzer)


habil_ Contracts, Competition, and the Theory of Reputation

Habilitation thesis, submitted to the Faculty of Law and Economics at the University of Bonn, October 1994.

diss Commitment in Games with Asymmetric Information

Ph.D. dissertation, submitted to the Faculty of Law and Economics at the University of Bonn, July 1991.

Articles in books and non-refereed journals:

kredit Vertrauen und soziale Präferenzen: Die Sicht der experimentellen Wirtschaftsforschung 

in: Annette Kehnel (Hg.), Kredit und Vertrauen, Frankfurt 2010, 225-236.

standardsetting Standards, Innovation Incentives, and the Formation of Patent Pools

in: Arvid Fredenberg (Hg), The Pros and Cons of Standard Setting, Stockholm 2010.

bwl Vertragstheorie

in: Köhler, R., Küpper, H.-U. und Pfingsten, A., Handwörterbuch der Betriebswirtschaftslehre, Stuttgart: Schäffer-Poeschel Verlag, 1937-1945.

altruism The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism - Experimental Evidence and New Theories

Handbook on the Economics of Giving, Reciprocity and Altruism, Vol. 1, 615-691 ed. by. Serge-Christophe Kolm and Jean Mercier Ythier, Amsterdam (2006): Elsevier. (with Ernst Fehr)

cesifo A Comment on Gayer and Shy

in: CESifo Economic Studies, Vol. 51 (2005), 491-493.

einsichten Vom Homo Oeconomicus zum Homo Reciprocans

Einsichten, 01/2004, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, 18-21.7

fairneshomoec_ Fairness und der Homo Oeconomicus

München (2004): Thinkers’ Corner.

dew Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity – Evidence and Economic Applications

in: Dewatripont, M., Advances in Economics and Econometrics, Eighth World Congress of the Econometric Society, Vol. 1, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, 208-257 (with Ernst Fehr).

auctions Efficiency of the Britisch UMTS Auction: A Comment on Börgers and Dustmann

in: Illing, G. and U. Klüh (eds.), Spectrum Auctions and Competition in Telecommunications, Cambridge (2003), Mass.: MIT-Press, 159-162.

wagnis Anreizprobleme bei der Finanzierung von Wagniskapital

in: W. Franz (eds.), Ökonomische Analyse von Verträgen, Tübingen (1999): Mohr-Siebeck, 248-84.

palgrave Contract Renegotiation and Option Contracts

in: Newman, Peter (ed.), The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, Vol. 1, London (1998): McMillan, 432-436.

priv Methods of Privatization: Auctions, Bargaining, and Giveaways

in: H. Giersch (ed.), Privatization at the End of the Century, Berlin: Springer, 1997, 97-134. (with Monika Schnitzer)

debtasoption_ Debt as an Option to Own in the Theory of Ownership Rights

in A. Picot and E. Schlicht (Hrsg.), Perspectives on Contract Theory, Berlin: Physica Verlag, 1995, 1-15. (with Georg Nöldeke)

macleod_ A Comment on W. Bentley MacLeod, `Incentives in Organizations: An Overview of Some of the Evidence and Theory'

in Siebert, Horst (ed.), Trends in Business Organization: Do Participation and Cooperation Increase Competitiveness? S. 43-49, Tübingen: JCB Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1994, 43-49.

Book Reviews:

jite Laffont, J.J. and J. Tirole: A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 150 (1994), 543-546.

Discussion Papers:


Procurement with Unforeseen Contingencies

(with Fabian Herweg), CEPR Discussion Paper 3483 (2017)

reply The Rhetoric of Inequity Aversion: A Reply

(with Ernst Fehr), mimeo, University of Munich, March 2005

Unpublished Manuscripts:

vertragdoc Vertragstheorie

Lecture notes on contract theory, courses given at MIT and at the Universities of Bonn and Munich, 1996, 299 pages